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Christian Jochim Naturalistic ethics in a Chinese context: Chang
Tsai's Contribution

Aiming to breathe new life into naturalistic ethics, this essay considers what is,
for the West, a new way of grasping the moral significance of "following
nature." In doing so, it explores certain unique features in the development of
Chinese naturalistic ethics and avoids interpreting this as corresponding to an
early stage in the evolution of Western philosophy. The two most important
features of Chinese naturalistic ethics that it explores are: (1) the idea that the
naturalness of some form of human behavior is a valid criterion of its moral
goodness, and (2) the view that harmony with the natural order is characteristic of a high degree of moral cultivation. Each of these corresponds to a
trend in Chinese thought lasting from its "formative period" (circa 500-200
B.C.E.) up to Sung times (960-1279 C.E.). Their synthesis in the thought of
Sung philosopher Chang Tsaia (1020-1077) is below shown to mark a
watershed in the course of Chinese moral philosophy.
The article is divided into three sections: the first deals with general
problems in the area of comparative East-West studies; the second treats the
two previously mentioned trends which emerged during the formative period
of Chinese philosophy; and the third deals, specifically, with Chang Tsai.
ON THE PRIMITIVITYOF NATURALISTICETHICS

One form of reductionism that can plague comparative studies occurs when
some foreign way of thinking is taken to correspond to an early stage in the
development of one's own intellectual tradition. A case of this is evident in
Donald Munro's otherwise excellent work The Concept of Man in Early
China.' Commenting on the "natural basis of the social" in the thought of late
Chou Confucians, he makes the remark: "When philosophical thought is just
about to emerge in a society there is a tendency to read the human social order
into the structure of the universe."2 In the West, Munro indicates, this
occurred when the pre-Socratics assigned each of their four basic elements
(earth, air, fire, and water) a sphere of natural influence analogous to one of
the inviolate social divisions specified by Greek tribal customs.3 The Chinese,
he argues, had an even stronger penchant for reading human social and moral
values into nature. Not only was the social idea of proper spheres of influence
read into the universe (also as part of a theory of the elements), but so were
such important moral concepts as sincerity (ch'engb), humanity (jenc), and
propriety (lid). In essence, the idea of cosmic order was itself abstracted from
human social experience.4
Munro's assessment of the role given nature in the socioethical views of late
Chou philosophers has been challenged, but not due to any heightened
sensitivity toward the idea that moral knowledge can be derived from, not
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read into, the naturalworld. It has been criticized,for example,by Henry
Rosemontfor emphasizingpassagesthat suggesta naturalbasis for ethics in
the otherwise thoroughly rational and humanistic writings of the early
Confucians.5The revealingthing is Rosemont'sfeelingthat the issue is not of
any philosophicalsignificance,"exceptthat it attributesa fairlynaivemonism
to the Confucians."6Perhapshe feels this way because,like Munro,he takes
for grantedthat there must be somethingprimitiveabout any ethics which
looks to naturefor principlesto guidehumanbehavior.However,an ethicsof
this type is only primitivefrom a particularlymodern point of view which
assumesa priorithat natureis devoid of ethicalqualities.The sourcesof this
perspectivemust be examinedbefore one can renderany judgmentsconcerning naturalisticethicsin a Chinesecontext.
Increasedurbanization,greatercontrol over the naturalworld, the emergence of the Darwinianmodel of nature, and related developmentswithin
philosophyand theologyhavecontributedto the view that the naturalrealmis
an amoralone. Characteristicof these developments,and a locus classicuson
the subjectof nature'sirrelevancefor the morallife, is John StuartMill'sessay
on "Nature."The followingquote is fromthe conclusionto that essay.
The schemeof natureregardedin its whole extent, cannot have had, for its
sole or even principalobject, the good of human or other sentientbeings.
What good it brings to them, is mostly the result of their own exertions.
Whatsoever,in nature, gives indication of beneficentdesign, proves this
beneficenceto be armedwith only limitedpower;and the duty of man is to
cooperate with the beneficentpowers, not by imitating but by perpetually
strivingto amendthe courseof nature-bringing that partof it over whichwe
can exertcontrol more nearlyinto conformitywith a high standardof justice
and goodness.7
Withinthis type of perspective,as Mill argues,the only positivevaluethe term
"natural"can denoteis the absenceof affectation.8It is foolish fromthis point
of view to considerwhat is naturalto be a criterionfor what is moral.
Anotherperhapseven more significanttrendthat underliesthe West'sdrift
away from naturalisticethics was initiatedearly in the twentiethcenturyby
G. E. Moore, himself a critic of John Stuart Mill. In his PrincipiaEthica,9
Moore drew attentionto an error in logic that he felt was inherentin any
attemptto derivean ethicalnorm (an "ought"statement)from a beliefabout
the natureof things(an "is" statement).The peculiardesignationthat he used
for this error,the "naturalisticfallacy,"has becomestandardin recentmoral
discourse;and its avoidancehas become a commandmentof contemporary
ethics."Naturalisticfallacy"is a peculiarterm,in the firstplace,becauseit can
be appliedto an ethics in whichnatureis deniedany substantiverole, such as
that of Mill, who was criticized by Moore for reducing a value term
("goodness")to an empiricallydeterminableproperty("desirability").'°It is
peculiar, second, because it has led to the perhaps false yet widely held
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assumptionthat its discoverywas the death knell of ethical naturalism,and
in any form."1
also ethicalsupernaturalism,
However, not all recent Western moral philosophers have shared this
assumption. The American pragmatistJohn Dewey, for example, was a
proponentof ethicalnaturalismwho gaineda largefollowingin the West and
(interestingto note in this regard)in China.In HumanNatureand Conduct,he
sought to bridgethe gap betweenthe naturaland the moral by giving a role
within ethics to "naturalimpulses"and the empiricalobservationof human
behavior. Indicative of this aspect of his approach in that work is the
statement:"Moralityis an endeavorto find for the manifestationof impulsein
specificsituationsan officeof refreshmentand renewal."12 Yet, on the whole,
his approachwas too qualifiedto be calledan ethicsof "followingnature."
A position that is more appealingfor presentpurposes,a variationupon
what has been called "ethicalsupernaturalism,"
is outlinedin a recentarticle
by John Crossley.'3FollowingRichardBrandt,he takes "ethicalsupernaturalism" to mean a particularway of justifyingethical statementsin which they
are derivedfrom theologicalpremisesin a fashionthat appearsto committhe
naturalisticfallacy.He gives the example14:
Premise:God is the Creatorand loving Fatherof all men.
Conclusion:You shouldlove Him and all men.
Due to an impliedsecond premise("Anyonewhom God has createdshould
love Him and His creation"),Crossleypoints out, the syllogismis formally
correct.When we realize that the second premiseis an ethical as well as a
theologicalone, we see that the real problemlies beyond any formaldistinction betweena theological(descriptive)statementand an ethical (normative)
one. As Crossley puts it: "There is no logical fallacy in the justifying
procedure;the 'problem'lies ratherin how one knows in the first place that
eitherof the premisesis true."'5
When Crossleyaddressesthis problem,the resultsare noteworthyfor any
effort to relate the moral to the ontological (whetherone's metaphysicsis
naturalisticor supernaturalistic).
He considersthe experienceof a "claim"on
oneself the startingpoint for both theology and ethics, explaininghis view as
follows:
The religiousexperienceof gratitudeand the moral experienceof obligation
have the same root, viz., the experienceof being claimed.The experienceof
God is alreadypartiallya moralexperience,and the experienceof obligationis
already.partially a religious experience. This "double" yet finally single
startingpoint for both theology and ethics overcomes,on the one hand, the
problemof derivingan ought from an is, and on the other hand, the problem
of theologicalethicsremainingaloof from ordinarymoralexperience.16
While not immediatelyrelevant, one may wonder whether this theological
languagehas any bearingupon an investigationinto the viabilityof Chinese
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naturalisticethics. Following Crossleya little further,it seems that there is
indeed a connection.His final appeal is to process theology, "becausesuch
theology tends by its nature to stick close to human experience in its
development."17 This connectionis worth mentioninghere not only because
process thought itself drives theology away from supernaturalism,but also
becauseit has affinitieswith the Chineseviews to be discussedlater.This will
become clear even as the first part of this essay is concluded, but it will
especiallystrikeus when we latersee how ChangTsai'sthoughtitselfis dually
groundedin the moraland the ontological.
The precedingexamples reveal, in differentways, the verdict of modern
Westernethics on the subjectof the moral viabilityof the imperative"follow
nature";and, in so doing, they raise further questions. Against what did
modernthinkerssuch as Mill, Dewey, and others react?What was meant by
"followingnature"in the premodernphilosophiesagainstwhichthey reacted?
The answerto such questionslies largelyin consideringtwo essentialelements
of the moralunderstandingof naturein the premodernWest:providenceand
naturallaw (eachof whichtakes for grantedthe idea of supernaturalinfluence
upon nature).
Both Mill and Dewey oppose any demandto follow naturewhendefinedas
a demandto act in compliancewith purposesor laws of divineorigin,'8 and
Crossleyleans away from traditionalsupernaturalismtoward process theology. It is far from self-evident that this kind of opposition is directly
applicableto Chineseusages of nature as an ethical category. Consider,in
relationto this, the implicationsof a statementmade by JosephNeedhamin
concludinghis well-knownessay "Human Law and the Laws of Nature in
China and the West." In contradistinctionto the Westernview of nature,
dependentupon the idea of an externallawgiver,Needhamexplains:
The Chineseworld-viewdependedon a totally differentline of thought.The
harmoniouscooperationof all beingsarose,not from the ordersof a superior
authorityexternalto themselves,but from the fact that they were all parts in
a hierarchyof wholes forminga cosmic pattern,and what they obeyed were
the internaldictatesof theirown natures.19
In conclusion,the reasonsfor the rejection,by most contemporaryethicists,
of the commandto follow naturemay not be at all relevantto Chineseethics
with its processualunderpinnings.It is carelessto assume,withoutconsidering
these reasons,that naturalisticethicsin any form belongsamongthe errorsof
our bygonepast. Below, certainChineseeffortsto employnatureas an ethical
categorywill be treatedwith the aim in mind of renderinga freshjudgment
upon theirviability.
NATURALISTICETHICSIN THE FORMATIVEPERIOD OF CHINESEPHILOSOPHY

Discussionfocuseshereon just two ways in whichearlyChinesethinkersused
the "natural"as a moral category,without insistingthat these were the only
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importantones ever to emergein China. The first concernsthe idea that the
naturalnessof some form of human behavioris a valid criterionof its moral
goodness;and the second concernsthe view that harmonywith the natural
orderis characteristicof a high degreeof moralcultivation.
Each of the suggesteduses of the concept "natural"conveys a different
shade of meaning.The idea of the naturalnessof a certainform of behavior
refersspecificallyto what is "natural"for a human being, that is, to innate
human tendencies.The idea of the moral worth of harmonywith nature is
morecloselyconnectedwith the "natural"as it pertainsto the courseof things
apart from humanity.Two importantschools of early Chinesethought each
respectivelyemphasizedone of these two sensesof "natural."The Confucians
were interestedin what kind of behavior was naturalfor the human.The
Taoists paid attention to what was natural apart from homo sapiens, not
praisingthis speciesfor any uniquequalities.
WithinearlyConfucianism,Menciusprovidesthe classicalinterpretationof
morality as being distinctively human but, at the same time, naturally
grounded. Interestingly,the most famous passage expressingthis interpretation begins with a story that demonstratesthe naturalnessof human
responsein the face of a moral"claim."Menciusthereinstates:
My reasonfor sayingthat no man is devoidof a heartsensitiveto the suffering
of othersis this. Supposea man were,all of a sudden,to see a young child on
the verge of falling into a well. He would certainlybe moved to compassion,
not becausehe wantedto get in the good gracesof the parents,nor becausehe
wishedto win the praiseof his fellow villagersor friends,nor yet becausehe
dislikedthe cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoeveris devoidof
the heartof compassionis not human,whoeveris devoidof the heartof shame
is not human,whoeveris devoid of the heart of courtesyand modestyis not
human,and whoeveris devoid of the heartof right and wrong is not human.
The heart of compassionis the germ of benevolence;the heart of shame, of
dutifulness;the heartof courtesyand modesty,of observanceof the rites;the
heartof rightand wrong,of wisdom.Man has these four germsjust as he has
four limbs(2A: 6).20
Three things of significancemark this passage:(1) Mencius argues for the
original goodness of human nature, (2) he does so by reference to an experience
of moral obligation, and (3) he presents this experience as a natural basis for

morality. All three observations make sense in light of the idea of the
naturalnessof an act as a criterionof its goodness.D. C. Lau, translatorof the
precedingpassage,has stressedhow Mencius specificallyintendedto convey
his hypotheticalman's altruisticdisinterestedness("not becausehe wantedto
get in the good gracesof the parents,"and so on) and, also, the spontaneousness of the man'sexperienceof his heart of compassion.2'Similarly,Mencius
insists that each of the four germs, or four beginnings,22is the naturaland
experientialroot of one of the four Confuciancardinalvirtues:benevolence
(jen), dutifulness(ie), observanceof the rites(li), and wisdom(chihf).
Donald Munro develops this furtherby pointing out two criteriaused by
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early Confuciansto recognize what was naturalfor humans,and therefore
good: (1) the ease or joy with whichit occursin practiceand (2) its automatic
appealto the babelikemind or heart(ch'ih-tzu-chih-hsing).23In additionto the
passagealreadyquoted,theseare suggestedelsewherein Mencius:
Mencius said "... reason and rightness (i) please my mind in the same way as

meat pleasesmy palate" (6A:7). And, "A great man is one who retainsthe
heartof a new-bornbabe"(4B: 12).24
Munroand otherscholarshave even found hintsin Menciusof a fundamental,
perhaps"religious,"experiencewith both moral and ontologicaldimensions.
The key referencein Mencius (2A:2) describes a relationshipbetween i
(dutifulnessor rightness)and a certainfloodlikech'ih(etheror matter-energy).
This relationshipis such that cultivationof i is closelytied to one's ontological
groundingin the universe.This is, in particular,the interpretationof Cheng
Chung-ying in his article "On yi as a universal principle of specific
Applicationin Confucianmorality."25
Lookingat anotherside of the issue,Menciusconsideredsome tendenciesof
humansutterlydevoid of moral significance.The mouth'staste for meat may
be analogous to the mind's inclination toward reason and rightness,but
Menciusconsideredthe latter absolutelydifferentfrom the former(7B:24).
Just how this view could be reconciledwith that of the goodness of human
natureremainedproblematicup to ChangTsai'stime (see following).
In contrastto Mencius'qualifieduse of naturalnessas a moralcriterion,the
author of the Tao-te-chingi set forth a concept of the natural,uncoloredby
any bias towardthe particularqualitiesor needs of the human species.The
resultingview of behavior might, from a thoroughlyhomocentricpoint of
view, be branded"amoral."Interpreteddifferently,however,this text may be
said to advocatethe completemergingof the naturaland moralspheres.When
refusingto distinguishbetweengood and evil, the Tao-te-chingintends only
to rejectthat kindof moralconsciousnesswhichthinkssolelyin termsof what
is good or bad for humanity.26It likewiseaims to shun all homocentricvalues
with its assertion:"Heavenand Earthare not humane(jen). They regardall
thingsas strawdogs."27But it does so only in orderto set up an alternative
set of moral values, exhibitedby naturefor humanemulation.These include
simplicity,spontaneity,tolerance,adaptability,impartiality,and the talent of
yieldingin appropriatecircumstances.
Thereis difficultyin interpretingLao-tzu this way not only becauseof this
earlier mentionedrejectionof conventionalmorality, but also because his
tone of normativeethics.Evidenceof this lies in
work lacksthe "prescriptive"
the use of simpledeclarativeEnglish,for most passages,by translatorsof the
Tao-te-ching(who intentionallychoose this over imperativeusages,therebeing
no distinctionapart from context in classicalChinesebetweenthe two forms
of usage).Yet some of these sametranslatorsinsistupon viewingLao-tzuas a
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moral, politicalphilosopher.28In light of his professedantimoralisticstance
and his apparentlynonnormativestyle, how can he be so viewed?
Anyone seriouslyinterestedin answeringthis questionshouldconsultSungpeng Hsu's insightfularticle"Lao Tzu's Conceptionof Evil," whichhelps us
to see that Lao-tzu's implicitmoralityhas both a consistentunifyingtheme
and a definitecontent.29The theme is that of condemningthe assertiveuse of
the will as the cause of all unnecessarysufferingin the world. The content
consists, first, in avoiding such products of "willful action" (weij) as war,
competition,exploitationof the commonpeople,and alterationof the natural
world,and, second,in cultivatingsuchvaluesthat coincidewith the ability"to
act with no willful actions" (wei wu-weik) as the aforementioned values of

simplicity,spontaneity,and so on. This is not especiallynew to studentsof the
Tao-te-ching,but Hsu's effort to treat this work as a moral treatise,making
specific referenceto the descriptive/normativeproblem, is both new and
extremelypertinentto the concernsof this article.
Hsu refersto the productsof the assertiveuse of the will as "causalevils"
and distinguishesthese from "consequentialevils," whichare the unnecessary
sufferingswhich result secondarilyfrom "causal evils."30 Strictly speaking,
then, only the first are a proper target for moral condemnation,while the
secondsimplygive us a reasonto have compassionfor the sufferingof others.
At this point, a problem arises: among the condemnableproducts of the
assertive use of the will, Lao-tzu identifies prescriptivemorality itself.
However,the problemis not that Lao-tzuobjectsto the morallife as such;he
condemnsonly its degenerationinto a form characterizedby willfulnessand
affectation.Therefore,Lao-tzu's idea of the decline of Tao may afford a
solutionto this apparentproblem,and to the relatedproblemof the existence
of evil in a world spontaneouslyproducedfrom Tao. The relevantpassages
fromthe Tao-te-chingare cited by Hsu, as follows31:
Therefore,whenTao is lost, thereariseste.'
Whente is lost,jen appears.
Whenjen is lost, therecomes i.
Wheni is lost, thereappearsli.
What then is li?
It is the weaknessof loyaltyand trust.
It is the beginningof chaos in the world(ch. 38).
Whenthe greatTao declines,thereappearjen and i (ch. 18).
Abandonjen and discardi.
Thenthe peoplewill returnto filialpietyand compassion(ch. 19).
Thus, mainstays of Confucian morality like jen, i, and li are naught but
symptomsof the Tao's decline.We must give up our relianceupon them if we
are ever to manifestour true and naturalmoral qualities(for example,filial
piety and compassion). Otherwise,we will manage only to make matters
worse;for the operationsof Tao can neverbe disturbedwith impunity.
But how can one speakof interferingwith its operationsat all?Hsu givesus
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two reasons to believe that Lao-tzu can sensibly do so: (1) the human will is
put in a position of potential interference by Tao's decline, and (2) the will is,
in principle, free to interfere at all times. More striking is Hsu's view that the
idea of free will, far from being out of place in Lao-tzu's world-view, makes
more sense there than it does in the Western context in which a more explicit
free will theodicy was produced. He states:
It is important to note that Lao Tzu has no doubt that the will is free to
interfere with Tao. He is afraid that the use of the will, however, will cause
sufferings in the world and turn the spontaneous universe into a mechanistic
one bound by laws and virtues. How different is it from the dominant Western
philosophy, which tries to find in the supposedly mechanistic universe a room
for the freedom of the will so that it can build an ideal human society apart
from nature.32
Whether cultivating a moral lifestyle thoroughly in harmony with nonhuman
nature, such as Lao-tzu advocated, would be any more feasible than constructing an ideal human society apart from nature is hard to say. But one thing is
clear: his view of moral cultivation refused to tread just where the early
Confucians found their starting point-in the realm of values that are
uniquely human. Yet it was this antithetical difference which made the two
views susceptible to synthesis. Even before the close of the so-called formative
period of Chinese philosophy, the work of synthesis had begun in both the
Confucian and Taoists camps. Two brief examples must here suffice.
In the Confucian text Chung-yungm(The Mean in Action), the concept
ch'eng (sincerity), normally denoting the virtue of being completely true of
one's innately good human nature, was given an expanded cosmological
significance in at least one passage. It there states: "Sincerity is not only the
completion of one's own self, it is that by which all things are completed"
(ch. 25).33 As will become clear in looking at Chang Tsai's case, this was of no
small significance.
On the Taoist's side, such texts as the Chuang-tzunand the Huai-nan-tzu0
led toward synthesis by unfolding the idea, hinted at in the Tao-te-ching, that
the Tao particularizes itself in each individual thing. Chuang-tzu especially
thrived on this notion. For him, understanding nature meant grasping the
unique function and idiosyncratic worth of each part. Expressing the heart of
his perspective, he queried:
[Heaven] Blowing on the ten thousand things in a different way, so that each
can be itself-all take what they want for themselves, but who does the sounding? (ch. 2).34
This is precisely the perspective which led Joseph Needham to his previously
quoted conclusion, and also to his use of the designation "philosophy of
organism" to describe the traditional Chinese organismic thinking for the
particular view of human nature that the early Confucians had devised.35
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CHANG TSAI'S ETHICS

The synthetic nature of Chang Tsai's work is expressed through his ability to
see all values as being represented on two levels: the cosmological level of the
physical universe and the ethical level of human existence. This is evidenced in
the amalgam of "Taoistic" universal harmony and Confucian filial piety found
in the opeing lines of his famous Hsi-mingP (Western Inscription):
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature
as I find an intimate place in their midst.
Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which
directs the universe I consider as my nature.
All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.36
Furthermore, this describes an experience, which was for Chang a deeply
religious one, that provided a double (moral and ontological) ground for all of
his other endeavors, For Chang, the difference between the two dimensions
was at most one of degree, which accounts for his facility in moving from one
to the other. There are no distinctions in Chang's universe that are not
distinctions merely of degree; the universe is composed entirely of ch'i (matterenergy) in its alternating aspects of dispersion and condensation.
According to Chang, the source of all things and of all goodness in the
universe is ch'i in its purest aspect-as the 'Great Vacuity' (t'ai-hsiiu).Nothing
in the universe is without some element of goodness, although the potential for
evil increases where ch'i is condensed and turbid. Consider the view expressed
in the following passage.
Master Heng-ch'ii [Chang Tsai] said: As the Great Vacuity, material force
(ch'i) is extensive and vague. Yet it ascends and descends in all ways without
ever ceasing. Here lies the subtle, incipient activation of reality and unreality,
of motion and rest, and the beginning of yin and yang, as well as the elements
of strength and weakness.... Whether it be the countless variety of things in
their changing configurations or the mountains and rivers in their fixed forms,
the dregs of wine or the ashes of fire, there is nothing from which something
cannot be learned.37
As in the Taoist views that had earlier suggested a philosophy of organism, all
parts of nature have their unique worth. However, for Chang, this same
principle is also expressed on a specifically human level. He states: "Heaven
forms the substance of all things and nothing can be without it. It is like
humanity (jen), which forms the substance of all human affairs and is present
everywhere."38
Looking at the other side of the omnipresence of ch'i, the potential for evil
which arises wherever it is heavily condensed, we also find important ethical
implications. Just as ch 'i in its fully dispersed aspect as the great vacuity (and
interchangeably "heaven" and "tao") corresponds to goodness in humanity,
so also does ch'i in its condensed aspect as concrete things correspond to the
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human's evil-tending "physical nature." In the following passage from his
Cheng-mengr(Correction of YouthfulFolly), Chang speaks of this latter aspect
of ch'i as its "aspect of desire."
Tranquility and oneness characterize the Ether (ch'i) in its original aspect;
aggressiveness and acquisitiveness characterize it in its aspect of desire. The
concentration of the mouth and the belly upon drinking and eating, and of
those of the nose and tongue upon smelling and tasting: such is the aggressive
and acquisitive kind of nature. He who understands virtue allows (his body) to
have a sufficiency of these and no more. He neither enchains his mind with
sensual desire, injures theereat with what is small, nor destroys the root with
what is peripheral (ch. 6).3
One may note the similarity between this and Mencius' view concerning
sense inclinations as they exist within the individual along with the innately
good human nature. Chang, however, goes beyond Mencius in offering a
justification for viewing human behavior in this light. Doing so with his socalled doctrine of the physical nature, Chang gained the praise of later Sung
philosophers, especially Chu Hsis.40
Referring to the activity of ch'i, Chang at once solved the problem of
making a distinction between the two natures and also that of defining their
relation to one another. The originally good human nature, akin to Heaven,
was tied to ch'i as the Great Vacuity; the physical nature was, on the other
hand, connected with ch'i in its condensed aspect. The difference between the
two was ultimately one only of degree, so Chang could therefore speak of their
relationship in terms of the transformation of the physical nature, as in his
statement: "The great benefit of learning is to enable one to transform the
physical nature himself."41
With the idea of the transformation of the physical nature, we arrive at the
true merit of Chang's moral philosophy. This transformation may be affected
through learning, but not of the ordinary sense-oriented kind. It is best
effected through enlarging the mind, which is tantamount to bringing oneself
into harmony with the universe. The Cheng-mengexplains:
By expanding one's mind one is able to embody the things of the whole world.
If things are not thus all embodied, there will be something that remains
external to the mind. The minds of ordinary men are confined within the limits
of hearing and seeing, whereas the sage, by completely developing his nature,
prevents his mind from being restricted to hearing and seeing (ch. 7).42
In other words, if one relates to the universe only with one's physical nature,
with one's senses, it will reveal itself only partially and only as turbid matter.
But if one relates to it with one's higher nature, it will reveal itself as a moral
universe and a harmonious whole. In this ethical perspective, the category
"natural" must be grasped both in its particularly human sense as well as in its
reference to nonhuman nature. One can discover human moral nature only
through an expansion of one's mind which encompasses all of non-human
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nature. This dual realization of the moral value of the natural as it exists both
in and outside oneself is referred to by Chang as ch'eng ("sincerity"), the
concept that was so central in the Chung-yung, his favorite among the early
Confucian classics.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this article has been to explicate a Chinese form of naturalistic
ethics which, due to its underlying view of nature, is not tied to the ideas of
providence and natural law. Its underlying view of nature, in fact, may be
quite modern by Western standards. Joseph Needham has argued that it
borders on being post-Newtonian.43 However, this seems initially to detract
from rather than add to its moral relevance, for, in the modern view, nature is
wholly amoral. Contemporary moral philosophy, therefore, would appear to
have only two alternatives with regard to nature: either to argue for its moral
relevance by maintaining a premodern view of nature, along with its feature of
an external lawgiver; or to admit its moral irrelevance on the grounds that it is
guided by forces indifferent to any divine plan. This is, for example, just the
kind of choice we are given in the article on "Philosophical Ideas of Nature"
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which states:
If, on the one hand, nature is seen as irreducibly complex, the theater not of a
simple cosmic process but of countless and diverse processes, and if these
processes have produced mind but are not themselves guided by intelligence,
then there will be little plausibility in arguing directly from "natural" to
"good" or "obligatory."
On the other hand, where nature is taken as created by a wholly good, wise,
and omnipotent deity, to be natural is prima facie, to be worthy of being
created by such a being. But the existence of evil, however accounted for,
makes the inference (from natural to good or obligatory), even in this context,
unreliable.44
The implication here is clearly that both alternatives are dead ends. Moreover,
while the second of these may still have its supporters,45 it was until recently
hard to imagine a defense for the first emerging within contemporary Western
thought. Taking recent theological and ethical discussion informed by process
philosophy into account, this is easier to imagine. In much of Chinese thought,
however, it was taken for granted that nature, seen as a complex process in
which all the parts participate according to their internal dictates rather than
according to external intelligence, is a moral as well as a physical universe.
An understanding of the way in which the Chinese were able to find moral
relevance in nature conceived in nearly post-Newtonian fashion might inspire
contemporary ethics in a number of "process-oriented" ways. For example,
this understanding could suggest a "natural" ground for the type of situational
ethics currently in vogue. For it is quite probable that the most important
moral values that the Chinese discovered in nature, such as spontaneity,
harmoniousness, and adaptability to changing influences, provided the basis
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for their own preference for situational over legalistic ethics. A further
innovation may come from Chang Tsai's proposal that one's inner moral
nature is revealed to oneself only concurrently with the act of grasping the
entire scheme of nature as a moral environment. Ironically, then, with his
concept of "sincerity," Chang took something akin to that "absence of
affectation" which J. S. Mill had found to be the only positive value one could
assign to the term "natural," and he raised it to the level of a necessary and
sufficient basis for the moral life.
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